JEFFERSON COUNTY
LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS: ELIZABETH CHILSEN, ADAM BOLS (Chair), ROBERT DEWOLFE, DONNA HAUGOM, TRACY NEUHAUSER, SHERIFF PAUL MILBRATH, SAM LAMURO, PAUL HABLE, CHIEF WES BENISCH, ANGELA SWINEHART, CHIEF KRAIG BIEFELD (Vice-Chair), WARDEN Lt. JOHN SINCLAIR, TYLER KUBICEK, REP. CODY HORLACHER, RICK THOMAS, SHANA BEAL, CAPT. TRAVIS MAZE

Wednesday, February 16, 2022 at 1:00 p.m.

Jefferson County Court House
311 S Center Ave. Room 202
Jefferson WI 53549

Join Zoom Meeting
https://us06web.zoom.us/j/87299368270?pwd=L0lIU3hWWUJjempoemh3NVIyVXpqZz09Meeting
ID: 872 9936 8270

Passcode: 720932

+1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)

1. Call to Order
2. Roll Call (establish a quorum)
3. Certification of Compliance with the Open Meetings Law
4. Review of the Agenda
5. Public Comment (Members of the public who wish to address the committee on specific agenda items must register their request at this time)
6. Discussion and approval of the November 17, 2021 meeting minutes.
7. Communications
8. Plan of Work :
9. Off-Site Plans 2022
10. Spill Reports
11. Pipeline Security For Rural Communities
12. Agency updates
    a. American Red Cross
    b. Salvation Army
    c. South Central WI Healthcare Emergency Readiness Coalition (SCWIHERC)
13. Set Time/Date of next meeting – Tentative May 18, 2022, at 1:00 pm, Jefferson County Courthouse Room 202
14. Adjourn

A quorum of any Jefferson County Committee, Board, Commission or other body, including the Jefferson County Board of Supervisors may be present at this meeting.

Individuals requiring special accommodations for attendance at this meeting should contact the County Administrator 24 hours prior to the meeting at (920) 674-7101 so appropriate arrangements can be made

JEFFERSON COUNTY
LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

VIA ZOOM

NOVEMBER 17, 2021

MEETING MINUTES

1. Call to Order – This meeting was called to order at 1:03 by Adam Bols.
2. Roll Call – Members Present via zoom : Gail Scott (zoom), , Kraig Briefield (zoom) Warden Brooks (Zoom) , Tyler Kubicek (zoom) Wes Benish and Paul Hable

   In Person - Adam Bols (in person) , Robert DeWolfe Donna Haugom Paul Hable, Matt Zangle, , Tracy Neuhauser, Sam Lamuro

   Ben Wehmeier (zoom) Anita Martin (in Person) Ronnie Monroe (Zoom)

3. In compliance with Open meetings law.
4. Public comment by Anita Martin – Wants to include more information

   Add Anita Boseman as an attendee at the August meeting

   Provides handout re: Enbridge spill and speaks on handout

5. Haugom add to amend August 2021 meeting minutes to add Anita Boseman as an attendee

May minutes approval

Paul moved

Benisch Seconds

August minutes approval

Gail Moves

DeWolfe Seconds

September minutes approval

Benisch Moves

Hable Seconds

Vote on all 3 sets of minutes – motion carries

6. Communications – none for this month
7. Haugom gives update on Computer Hazmat Equipment Grant. Last grant approved.
8. Plan of Work – EPCRA FFY 21 closed and accepted

   2022 Grant was submitted still waiting on response effective 10-1-2021 thru 9-30-2022 – Update to be given at next meeting.

9. Off site plans for 2022 – listed on attachment Haugom reviews the 12 companies up for off site plans this year. Reviews new county battery plan.
10. Waterloo Tabletop and Functional Exercise update given by Donna Haugom. Reviews how each exercise went and what improvements could be made and what resources can be utilized.
11. Enbridge update – Haugom reviews responses from Enbridge. Committee members confirm they received the Enbridge update that was sent earlier in the day. Questions from committee members are discussed.
12. Agency updates – American Red Cross – Not present Salvation Army – Not Present

Southwestern Central WI Healthcare Emergency Readiness Coalition – has been meeting almost daily re: COVID

13. Next proposed meeting date and time - February 16, 2022 at 1:00 pm Room 202 with a Zoom option.
14. Adjourn : Motion to Adjourn 1:57 Haugom votes Hable Seconds – Motion Carries

Pipeline Security for Rural Communities – Introduction

America's pipeline system stretches across the country like the veins and arteries of the human body. This system crosses the United States and is found in urban as well as rural environments. The system includes 2.7 million miles of pipelines, operated by over three thousand companies.[1] There are 212,568 miles of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline systems that stretch from production areas to refineries to consumers and manufactures.[2] The pipelines carry not only petroleum products and natural gas, but also other hazardous liquid or gas materials such as anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, and carbon dioxide.[3] In addition to the products being transported, the pipeline system includes critical facilities such as compressor, pumping, regulator, and valve stations, as well as breakout tanks and automatic systems to monitor and control the flow of product through the pipelines. Due to the need of the pipeline infrastructure to reach every part of the country, it is described as "running alternately through remote and densely populated regions" and "vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack."[4] As the Surface Division Director Sonya Proctor stated in her statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee (April, 2016),



Natural Hazardous Liquid and Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines
Source: Pipeline Hazardous Materials and Safety Administration

> As evidenced by recent attacks in Brussels, Paris and elsewhere, the terrorist threat has grown increasing complex and diffuse, with the potential for terrorist actors to become radicalized and carry out an attack with little warning. An attack against a pipeline system could result in loss of life and have significant economic effects.[5]

Pipeline attacks could come in a variety of modes, including physical attack (e.g., firearms or improvised explosive devices) or cyber attack.[6] "It is widely documented that terrorist groups around the world often attack energy pipelines and the personnel working there. Through acts of sabotage, bombing and kidnapping, terrorist or insurgent groups may seek to derail the construction of pipelines or the flow of oil or gas. Such attacks have occurred in many countries, including Colombia, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia."[7] In the last two decades, Columbian guerillas have attacked the pipelines in that country more than 1,000 times, resulting in the loss of at least 2.9 billion barrels of crude oil.[8] There have been six bombings of Canadian pipelines in British Columbia.[9]

The examination of pipeline ruptures with other causal factors provide a basis for understanding the consequences of a terrorist attack directed at a pipeline. Pipeline explosions have demonstrated their lethality. In 2000, a natural gas pipeline explosion killed nine people camping in a rural location in New Mexico.[10] In two separate pipeline explosions on June 8 and 9, 2010, in Texas, three workers were killed.[11] Eight people were killed and 37 homes were destroyed in

the September 2010, San Bruno, CA pipeline explosion.[12] Five people were killed and eight houses were destroyed in a gas explosion and fire in Allentown, PA in February, 2011 with the estimated property damage from the rupture to be $2.5 million.[13] Workers in Topeka, KS hit a gas line while installing a sprinkler system on January 30, 2012 causing an explosion that killed a 73-year old woman.[14] On March 12, 2014, two adjacent multiuse five-story buildings were destroyed by a natural gas-fueled explosion and fire resulting in the death of eight people, more than 50 people were injured, and more than 100 families were displaced from their homes in East Harlem, New York. The cost to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (ConEdison), of equipment damages, emergency response activities, remediation, and replacement exceeded $1.9 million.[15] On January 2, 2016 a natural gas pipeline explosion in Oklahoma City, OK injured one resident and caused nearly a half million dollars in damage to dozens of homes.[16]

The purpose of this awareness level, instructor-led course is to bring together rural pipeline security stakeholders including public safety, oil and gas pipeline representatives (large and small), local emergency planners, pertinent federal agencies, and other community stakeholders to recognize pipeline security threats and identify mitigation strategies within their jurisdictions to ensure the rural pipeline sector is secure and resilient.

The importance of securing the U.S. pipeline system was originally addressed in *Homeland Security Presidential Directive* (HSPD) 7, issued December 2003. HSPD-7 designated the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal agency for pipeline security and directs that DHS and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) collaborate in regulating the transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines). DHS's Transportation Security Administration's Surface Transportation Division was instrumental in assisting the Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium throughout development of this pipeline security course.

As annexes to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NIPP 2013) as set forth in the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience which replaced HSPD-7, the Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) for Transportation and Energy both address the efforts needed to improve security and resilience in those sectors which includes pipelines. This course supports the SSPs for Transportation and Energy and also supports the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan Pipeline Modal Annex that was part of the 2010 Transportation SSP. The Plan and the Pipeline Modal Annex were developed, reviewed, and updated using both the Transportation Sector and the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) frameworks.[17] As stated in the Annex, "a robust, nationwide pipeline security program will instill public confidence in the reliability of the Nation's critical energy infrastructure, enhance public safety, and ensure the continued functioning of other critical infrastructure sectors that depend on secure and reliable supplies of products for consumption."[18]

In the National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition September 2015, released as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9, it states that technological and accidental hazards, such as transportation system failures, chemical spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and severe economic impacts.[19] In addition, the National Preparedness Goal considers cyberattacks to have potential catastrophic consequences. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation's security, economy, and public safety and health at risk.[20] This course supports these tenants of the National Preparedness Goal and emphasizes the

importance of preventing pipeline incidents that involve chemical spills or releases as well as cyberattacks.

One of the main DHS Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Surface Division's objectives to achieve its transportation sector security goals is to increase the level of domain awareness, information sharing, response planning and coordination. Furthermore, the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) convened a joint Public Awareness Program Working Group (PAPWG) in September 2013 to foster public awareness continuous improvements which resulted in a final report released in May 2016 titled: Pipeline Public Awareness Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT). One of the findings from that report states:

> There are numerous examples of operators communicating well with emergency responders; however, there are still weaknesses in the overall effectiveness of pipeline operators' outreach to emergency responders. Operators are not consistent in adequately identifying, communicating with, and coordinating with all emergency response stakeholders within a community. This lack of emergency responder awareness may also be caused in part by ineffective dissemination of pipeline information within emergency responder organizations even when it is communicated to them by the pipeline operator.[21]

This awareness level course supports the objective of TSA's Surface Division as well as the recommendations of DOT's working group and brings together the interdisciplinary stakeholders that may be involved with pipeline security incidents, and enhances the collaboration between pipeline industry stakeholders and the emergency response community in planning, prevention, response, and recovery as they pertain to pipeline security incidents in rural communities.

This course supports the strategic goals of *Presidential Policy Directives 21 (PPD-21) – Critical Infrastructure and Resilience, PPD-8 – National Preparedness,* the *National Preparedness Goal* and the Core Capabilities specifically those shown in the table below.

CORE CAPABILITIES
Operational Coordination (Primary)
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Threats and Hazard Identification
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities
Interdiction and Disruption
Physical Protective Measures

Economic Recovery

Supporting these capabilities will allow the rural emergency response community, the pipeline industry, and community stakeholders to collaborate, communicate, and share information in order to achieve coordinated awareness, prevention, protection against, and response to pipeline security incidents in a rural community.

Module 1 – Introduction and Course Overview - Administration Page

Duration:

0.75 hours

Scope Statement:

This module includes information on the roles of pipeline stakeholders, including emergency responders and pipeline industry, in the pipeline security planning and response coordinated process. In addition, introductory administrative tasks including a review of the course goals and objectives and a pre-test are included.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to identify the role of pipeline stakeholders in the pipeline security planning and response coordinated process as well articulate the course goals and objectives of the course.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 1-1: List the course goals and objectives.
- ELO 1-2: Identify the roles of the pipeline stakeholders (including emergency responders and pipeline industry) in the pipeline security planning and response coordinated process.
- ELO 1-3: Record baseline level of knowledge by completing the pre-test.

Resources:

Pre-test

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness (http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm)*
- *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience* (https://www.gps.gov/multimedia/presentations/2014/11/ICG/dhs.pdf)
- *National Preparedness Goal (https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal)*
- *National Response Framework (NRF)* (https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf)
- *National Incident Management System (NIMS) (http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system)*

- *FEMA, Federal Interagency Operational Plan – Response and Recovery – Oil/Chemical Annex (2016) (https://www.interagencyboard.org/system/files/resources/Final%20%20Oil_Chemical_Incident_Annex%206_02_16.pdf)*
- *Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan, Pipeline Modal Annex (https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=474337)*
- *Federal Register, 49 CFR Part 195 – Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. (Most recent amendments 2015) (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/10/13/2015-25359/pipeline-safety-safety-of-hazardous-liquid-pipelines)*
- *FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Planning: Practices for Land Use Planning and Development near Pipelines (2015) (https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1422297186422-e43ce828d6821027c258e96eae10fd6d/PIPA_Hazard_Mitigation_Primer_Final.pdf)*
- *National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 2013 (including Supplements and Sector Specific Annexes (Transportation Sector, Energy Sector)) (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/national-infrastructure-protection-plan-2013-508.pdf)*
- *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0.* (https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-0014/cpg_101_comprehensive_preparedness_guide_developing_and_maintaining_emergency_operations_plans_2010.pdf)
- *GAO-10-867: PIPELINE SECURITY; TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen Security, but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes, August 2010 (https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308800.pdf)*

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 2 - Importance of Pipelines - Administration Page

Duration:

0.75 hours

Scope Statement:

The participants will be introduced to the importance of pipelines, including the major pipeline stakeholders and the concept of interdependency. In addition, the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) will be reviewed to help identify local pipeline owners and operators as part of the overall planning process.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

At the conclusion of this module, the participant will be able to recognize the major stakeholders and operators of the various pipelines across the United States and the issues related to interdependency as well as be able to identify local pipeline owners and operators by using the NPMS as part of the overall planning process.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 2.1 – Identify the major stakeholders and owners of the major pipeline systems across the United States.
- ELO 2.2 – Identify local pipeline owners and operators using the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) as part of the overall planning process.
- ELO 2.3 – Describe the economic impact of interdependency among the major pipeline systems and other transportation modes.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- American Petroleum Institute. *Pipeline 101.*
- Interstate Natural Gas Association of America. *Pipelines 101*.
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Pipeline Safety Awareness (PHMSA). *Pipeline 101*.
- DOT PHMSA Public Awareness Program Working Group (PAPWG) Final Report: Pipeline Public Awareness Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT).

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.

- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 3 – Pipeline Basics - Administration Page

Duration:

1.0 hours

Scope Statement:

In this module, participants will be introduced to basic components of the pipeline system which include: the terminology used in the pipeline industry, types of pipelines, and the materials that move through the pipelines. This module will present materials and information on how to properly identify pipeline locations and possible products.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

By the end of this module the participant will be able to recognize and make use of the terminology used in the pipeline industry, recognize the basic system components, the type of materials that flow through the pipelines and how to identify pipelines in the field.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 3.1 – List pipeline system components.
- ELO 3.2 – Identify the different types of pipeline systems and the products that can flow through these systems.
- ELO 3.3 – Identify pipelines in the field and the products carried in them.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- American Petroleum Institute. *Pipeline 101.*
- Interstate Natural Gas Association of America. *Pipelines 101*.
- U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Pipeline Safety Awareness. *Pipeline 101*.
- Common Ground Alliance – Call Before You Dig/Call 811. http://www.call811.com/

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 4 – Government Roles and Responsibilities in Pipeline Security Administration Page

Duration:

0.50 hours

Scope Statement:

This module is designed to introduce participants to the roles and responsibilities of government agencies as they relate to pipeline security as well as associated programs that impact pipeline security. Federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, in particular the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as well as the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) are key agencies for rural emergency.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

By the end of this module the participant will be able to identify the roles and responsibilities of governmental agencies as it relates to pipeline security as well as specific governmental security programs that impact pipeline security.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 4.1 – Identify the roles and responsibilities of three government agencies involved in the protection of the Nation's pipeline critical infrastructure and key resources.
- ELO 4.2 – Identify three government programs that impact pipeline security.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 2013 (including Supplements and Sector Specific Annexes (Transportation Sector, Energy Sector)) (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/national-infrastructure-protection-plan-2013-508.pdf)

- Federal Register, 49 CFR Part 195 – Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines. (Most recent amendments 2015) (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/10/13/2015-25359/pipeline-safety-safety-of-hazardous-liquid-pipelines)

- FEMA, Federal Interagency Operational Plan – Response and Recovery – Oil/Chemical Annex (2016)

(https://www.interagencyboard.org/system/files/resources/Final%20%20Oil_Chemical_Incident_Annex%206_02_16.pdf)

- Congressional Research Service. Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs. 2008.
- Forman, Gary L. Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations and Oversight. April 19, 2010. http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100419105451-78371.pdf
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. Pipeline Security. TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen Security, but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes. August 2010. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-867
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Transportation Security Administration. Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan, March 2010 http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/pipeline_sec_and_incid_recov_prot_plan.pdf
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Transportation Security Administration. Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-transportation-systems-2010.pdf

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 5 – Industry Roles and Responsibilities in Pipeline Security Administration Page

Duration:

0.5 hours

Scope Statement:

This module is designed to introduce participants to the roles and responsibilities of pipeline industry as it relates to pipeline security as well as specific pipeline security programs that are carried out by private pipeline industry and industry associations.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

By the end of this module the participant will be able to identify the roles and responsibilities of pipeline industry and trade associations as it relates to pipeline security as well as specific industry security programs that currently exist.

Enabling Learning Objective (ELO):

- ELO 5.1 – Describe private industry's role and responsibility and associated industry programs that impact pipeline security.
- ELO 5.2 – List the major trade associations associated with the pipeline industry.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Transportation Security Administration. *Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan, March 2010* https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/pipeline_sec_incident_recvr_protocol_plan.pdf
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan. Pipeline Modal Annex. 2010.*

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 6 – Pipeline Incidents / Security Threats - Administration Page

Duration:

0.75 hours

Scope Statement:

This module allows for the current threats to the pipeline systems in the United States including cybersecurity threats and the criminal penalties for willfully damaging pipelines and associated components to be discussed as well as what makes pipelines vulnerable to attacks. The examination of pipeline ruptures with other causal factors is also discussed to provide a basis for understanding the consequences of a terrorist attack directed at a pipeline. In addition, international terror attacks on pipeline systems will be reviewed.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

By the end of this module the participant will be able to list factors that make pipelines vulnerable to attacks, describe national and international pipeline attacks and/or incidents, recognize current threats, and describe the criminal penalties for willfully damaging pipelines an associated components.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 6.1 – List factors that make pipelines vulnerable to attacks.
- ELO .6.2 – Identify pipeline ruptures or explosion incidents that have taken place in the United States as well as terrorist attacks that have occurred internationally.
- ELO 6.3 – Identify current threats to the pipeline systems in the United States, including cybersecurity.
- ELO 6.4 – Describe the criminal penalties associated with a person willfully damaging pipelines and associated components.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. *Energy Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance*. January 2015
- U.S. Department of Transportation. Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration. *Pipeline Incident and Mileage Reports.*
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Transportation Security Administration. Office of Intelligence and Analysis. *Modal Threat Analyses: Pipeline. 2012.*

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation as well as performance in practical exercises.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 7– Indicators of Suspicious Activity at a Pipeline- Administration Page

Duration:

1.0 hours

Scope Statement:

This module is designed to present indicators of suspicious activity at a pipeline to the participants. In addition, recommended actions for reporting suspicious activities will be discussed. Man-made activities that may threaten a pipeline are also discussed.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

By the end of this module the participant will be able to identify: indicators of suspicious activity, recommended action to report suspicious activity, and man-made activities that may threaten a pipeline.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 7.1 – List the eight signs of terrorism.
- ELO 7.2 – Identify indicators of suspicious activity at a pipeline.
- ELO 7.3 – Identify man-made activities that may threaten a pipeline.
- ELO 7.4 – Describe the recommended actions to take to report suspicious activity.

Resources:

See resources section at the end of this module.

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

- Montgomery County (MD) Police Department. Operation Tripwire. *Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities.* 2011.
- NCJRS. *Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct.* 2006.
- Rand Corporation. *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World.* 2004.
- State of Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center. *Suspicious Activities Reference Guide.* 2006.

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Transportation Security Administration. *Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan.* March 2010.

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Transportation Sector-Specific Plan Pipeline Modal Annex.*

Practical Exercise Statement:

NA

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation especially in facilitated scenario-based discussions.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 8 – Pipeline Security Scenario-Based Activity Administration Page

Duration:

1.0 hours

Scope Statement:

Using a scenario-based training event, the participants will collaborate to identify pipeline security threats and generate mitigation strategies for those threats utilizing information about resources (local, state, and federal) and interoperability that have been discussed. Based on the decisions made in the scenario, the participants will have to react to the outcomes presented. All disciplines will be integrated into the scenario to show interoperability and the collaboration required by all affected parties. A Pocket Guide to Pipeline Security Incidents job aid will also be reviewed as it relates to overall planning and response coordination.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to demonstrate effective threat assessment and the ability to identify mitigation strategies and assess outcomes based on decisions made as well as how the Pocket Guide job aid should be used as it relates to overall planning and response coordination.

Enabling Learning Objective (ELO):

- ELO 8.1 – Demonstrate effective pipeline threat identification and mitigation strategies by participating in scenario-based activities during which decisions must be made regarding the assessment, identification, and mitigation of pipeline security threats/incidents.
- ELO 8.2 – Demonstrate the use of the Pocket Guide to Pipeline Security Incidents job aid as it relates to overall planning and response coordination.

Resources:

Pocket Guide to Pipeline Security Incidents – one per participant

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List

NA

Practical Exercise Statement:

Scenario-based training activity utilizing video and decision making strategies.

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation in scenario-based activities.
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content.
- Administration of pre-test to assess participant's prior knowledge of the course materials and post-test at the end of the course to assess comprehension.

Module 9 – Post-test and Course Evaluation- Administration Page

Duration:

0.75 hours

Scope Statement:

In this final module, a post-test will be administered to the participants. They will also complete a Level 1 standardized course evaluation form and provide feedback on the content and instruction of the course. Participants who complete the post-test at a 70% passing rate and fill out an evaluation form will be issued a Certificate of Completion. Attendance is required with special circumstances handled at the lead instructor's discretion.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO):

At the conclusion of this module, participants will complete a comprehensive post-test and course evaluation.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO):

- ELO 9.1 – Demonstrate a foundation of knowledge regarding pipeline security by completing a post-test (with 70% or higher score).
- ELO 9.2 – Identify areas of improvement as well as competency regarding the course content and instruction by completing a course evaluation form.

Resources:

- Post-test
- Level 1 Standardized Course Evaluation form

Instructor to Participant Ratio:

1:25

Reference List:

N/A

Practical Exercise Statement:

N/A

Assessment Strategy:

- Observation of student participation
- Instructor facilitated verbal review of module content
- Administration of post-test

Pipeline Security for Rural Communities

Agenda

- 8:00am – 8:45am Module 1 - Introduction and Course Overview
- 8:45am – 9:30am Module 2 – Importance of the Pipeline System
- 9:30am – 9:45am Break
- 9:45am – 10:30am Module 3 – Pipeline Basics
- 10:30am – 11:00am Module 4 – Government Roles and Responsibilities in Pipeline Security
- 11:00am – 11:30am Module 5 – Industry Roles and Responsibilities in Pipeline Security
- 11:30am – 12:30pm Lunch
- 12:30pm – 1:30pm Module 6 –Pipeline Incidents/Security Threats
- 1:30pm – 2:30pm Module 7 – Indicators of Suspicious Activity at a Pipeline
- 2:30pm – 2:45pm Break
- 2:45pm – 4:00pm Module 8 – Pipeline Security Scenario-Based Activity and Debriefing (Pocket Guide)
- 4:00pm – 4:30pm Module 9 – Post-test and Course Evaluation

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North Shore Environmental Construction Inc.
N117 W18493 Fulton Drive
Germantown, WI 53022

www.nsecinc.com

November 28, 2021

Mr. Trevor Bannister
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
3911 Fish Hatchery Road
Fitchburg, WI 53711

SUBJECT: **North Shore Environmental Construction Inc.**
Manure spill located at W2949 Pipersville Road, Watertown, WI 53094

Dear Mr. Bannister,

In accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code Requirements NR 708.05(6) and 708.09, North Shore Environmental Construction Inc. (NSEC) hereby submits this final report and letter of compliance for immediate actions completed, and related documentation in support of no further action for a nonhazardous substance discharge which occurred at the above referenced site on November 28, 2021.

Time and Place of Spill: NSEC received a call from Alex Brooks (Warden / DNR) around 1500 on November 28, 2021. The spill was located at W2949 Pipersville Road, Watertown, WI 53094.

Initial Spill Notification: NSEC received a call from Alex Brooks (Warden / DNR) around 1500 on Sunday afternoon on November 28, 2021. NSEC was told that approximately 1,500 to 2,000 gallons of manure ran off a field into a creek that flowed to the Rock River. The DNR was notified by Jason Hoesly, owner of H&M Custom AG Services.

Cause and Type: Leaking discharge hose while injecting manure into a field.

Toxicity: Liquid manure.

Volume and Mobility: Approximately 1,500 – 2,000 gallons of liquid manure was released.

Duration of the Discharge: Unknown.

Response Time and Action: NSEC was notified around 1500 pm. NSEC dispatched a crew shorty after receiving the call. NSEC arrived on site around 1630 pm.

Mitigation Efforts that Accelerated Migration of Material: NSEC dispatched a vac truck and removed manure from the adjacent creek.

Weather Conditions: Weather conditions during the response were 28 degrees Fahrenheit and sunny.

Migration Potential of Release: The migration potential of the release was deemed minimal. Total amount was really unknown.

Immediate Action Taken:

November 28, 2021

NSEC mobilized personnel and equipment to the spill site at W2949 Pipersville Road Watertown, WI. Bob Borkenhagen, Project Manager from NSEC, arrived onsite at 1630 pm followed by support personnel and equipment at 1700 pm. NSEC placed absorbent boom on the south and north side of the culvert that runs underneath Pipersville Road. The direction of flow was north bound towards the Rock River. The Rock River is about 1.3 miles from the spill area. NSEC pumped about six hundred gallons from the creek where we could see foam and a trace of manure in the water. NSEC also placed absorbent boom on the west side of the culvert down gradient on Lange Ln. The liquid that was pumped out of the creek was unloaded at a local farmer's manure holding pit. A local contractor also built a soil berm on the field near a low spot (where the leak occurred) to prevent additional runoff.

November 29, 2021

NSEC checked the creek for signs of foam or manure in the creek around 1600 pm. There was a little foam buildup on the south side of the culvert located on Pipersville Road. The foam was built up behind the boom.

December 3rd 2021

NSEC recived a call from Jason Hoesly stating there were no signs of manure or foam in the creek. He said he pulled all the boom out of the creek. The WDNR requested that the boom stay in until Friday, December 3rd.

Confirmation Sampling: No samples were taken.

Visual and Olfactory Evidence: There is no remaining visible or olfactory evidence of the release following the response action (please see attached photos).

Actual or Potential Environmental Impacts: Based on the nature of the substance released, the interim and remedial actions taken, there are no actual or potential impacts to health or the environment.

Proximity of Contamination to Receptors: There was visable flow in the creek, and NSEC removed as much manure and foam from the creek as possible.

Present and Anticipated Land Use: Agricultural farm land.

Exposure Route Assessment: Based on the nature of the substance released, the interim and remedial actions taken, and the location of the release, no complete exposure pathways exist or were present for human or environmental receptors due to this incident.

Conclusion (Closure Documentation): All practicable response and cleanup measures were effectively implemented for this incident. No residual impacts remain in the environment. The area has been fully restored to its original condition and there is no further action necessary for this incident.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to call me at (414) 708-1467.

Robert Borkenhagen

Name : Robert Borkenhagen
Title: Project Manager
North Shore Environmental Construction Inc.

Attachment One:
Photos


WALKER
EMERGENCY RES
(262)255-4
FULL
EMPTY

SERTS ID	REPORTED DATE & TIME	DATE OCCURRED	SUBSTANCE	RECOVERED AMOUNT	REPORTED BY	LOCATION	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	CAUSE	CAUSE DESCRIPTION	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT	WEATHER	INJURIES	CLEAN UP	NOTIFIED
20210812SC28-1	8/12/2021 19:50	UNKNOWN	GASOLINE	UNKNOWN	WATERTOWN PD - DISPATCH	CITY OF WATERTOWN PARKING LOT 105 E MAIN ST	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	BYSTANDER NOTICED A PARKED VEHICLE LEAKING GAS	OVER 5 GALLONS WERE RELEASED ONTO ASPHALT PARKING LOT - NO WATERWAYS NEARBY	SUNNY	NONE	OIL DRY WAS PUT OUT BY WATERTOWN FIRE DEPT	SPOKE TO RILEY NEUMAN AT 20:15 BY PHONE
20210817SC28-1	8/17/2021 8:32	8/11/2021 2:00	MINERAL OIL	The transformer oil contained PCBs. SCS Engineers was hired to assist with the cleanup. It is unknown exactly how much oil spilled, but confirmation soil sampling documented that virtually all transformer oil was recovered through soil excavation.	LAKE MILLS LIGHT AND WATER EMPLOYEE	TOWNSHIP OF MILFORD DAY BREAK LLC W7299 CTY TK A GRAIN BIN	LAKE MILLS LIGHT AND WATER	BAD WEATHER - NATURAL DISASTER	HAPPENED DUE TO STORMS - UNSURE OF AMOUNT SPILLED	NONE	WINDY	NONE	EXCAVATING IMPACTED SOIL AND REMOVING IT	CALLED AND SPOKE WITH TREVOR BANNISTER AT 8:45
20210828SC28-1	8/28/2021 10:12	8/2/2021 9:48	DIESEL FUEL 100 GALLONS RELEASED	UNKNOWN	DNR WARDEN KYLE JOHNSON	CITY OF JEFFERSON BYPASS EXIT 26 ON HWY 26 500 FEET PAST FOOD ADVERTISEMENT	HOME CITY INC. IXONIA	VEHICLE OR VESSEL DERAILMENT ROLLOVER OR CAPSIZING	TRUCK WENT OFF OF THE EAST PART OF HWY 26 & THROUGH A CHAIN LINK FENCE IT TRAVELLED ACROSS THE BIKE PATH AND CAME TO A REST JUST BEFORE THE SOYBEAN FIELD	NO BODIES OF WATER NEARBY		DRIVER WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL	Fire Dept deployed initial absorbent material, but no additional cleanup has been performed. DNR has made several attempts to contact Home City Ice, both locally and at their Ohio headquarters. Cleanup has not been performed.	WARDEN JOHNSON CONTACTED HOME CITY ICE HE WAS FORWARDED TO A VOICEMAIL FOR JASON - A VOICEMAIL WAS LEFT ADVISING HIM TO CALL WARDEN JOHNSON AND REPORT THE SPILL TO THE HOTLINE
20211109SC28-1	11/9/2021 11:49	11/9/2021 10:39	DIESEL FUEL 10 GALLONS RELEASED	An estimated 10 gal of diesel fuel was released and all or most of the fuel was recovered through deployment and collection of absorbent material.	DNR WARDEN ALEXANDER BROOKS	TOWNSHIP OF AZTALAN RESIDENCE W6642 CTY HWY B & CTY HWY Q	FOREST LANDSCAPE AND CONSTRUCTION	VEHICLE OR VESSEL COLLISION	COLLISION OF A COMPACT SUV AND A DUMP TRUCK OWNED BY FOREST LANDSCAPE AND CONSTRUCTION. THE DUMP TRUCK HOLDS 30 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL	THE DUMP TRUCK RELEASED 5-10 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL ON A LAWN SURFACE. NO IMPACTED WATERWAYS . THE SUV ENGINE WAS EXPOSED - POSSIBLE OIL RELEASE	SUNNY	NONE REPORTED	TOPEL TOWING USED OIL DRY	WARDEN BROOKS CALLED IN THE SPILL HE WAS ON SCENE AND SPOKE TO CAROLINE RICE (REGIONAL SPILL COORDINATOR)
20211117SC28-1	11/17/2021 1300	11/17/2021	MANURE 3000 GALLONS RELEASED	Estimated 3,000 gal of manure was spilled and recovered through deployment and collection of sileage/straw. The road was pressure washed to remove manure. A DNR Conservation Warden was present during and after cleanup to document completion of cleanup activities.	H&M AG SERVICES - JASON HOESLY	TOWNSHIP OF KOSHKONONG / START SCHOOL RD	H&M AG SERVICES	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	A HOSE BLEW	NONE	SUNNY	NONE REPORTED	STRAW WAS PUT DOWN AND THE ROAD WAS SPRAYED WITH WATER A DNR Conservation Warden was present during and after cleanup to document completion of cleanup activities.	CAROLINE RICE WAS CALLED AT 13:14
20211228SC28-1	11/28/2021	11/28/2021	1500-2000 Gallons of Manure Released	It's unknown how much manure was recovered.	Jason Hosley Rosey Lane	W2949 Pipersville Rd	H&M Custom AG Services	Equipment Failure	Hydraulic Line Break	Manure is believed to have flowed into the creek and through to the Rock River. Five dead fish were reportedly observed in the creek. The water was flowing clear on Nov 29, with only minor foaming observed at the absorbent boom at the culvert.	COLD	NONE REPORTED	A berm was constructed to minimize manure flowing off the field into the drainage ditch. Manure and absorbent material were scraped from soil in and adjacent to the ditch, and North Shore installed absorbent boom adjacent to the culvert on Lange Ln. North Shore collected an estimated 800 gal of manure-impacted water from the creek using a vacuum truck. These actions were taken on Nov 28, 2021. North Shore monitored the creek on Nov 29 and observed minor impacts, and the absorbent booms were recovered from the culvert on Dec 3, 2021.	Called in ans spoke wit Matt Thompson at 2:38 pm
20211208SC28-1	12/8/2021	12/7/2021 or 12/8/2021	The DNR believe that the substance was a food grade latex type material, potentially a GenFlo product, based on information from the business. Quantity released is unknown; none was recovered.	None was recovered	MAUREEN MCBROOM - CITY OF WATERTOWN	CITY OF WATERTOWN CHANNEL & RIVER 546 WEST ST / RAIL & TRANSLOAD INC	We believe the responsible party to be Specialty Ingredients (aka Rail & Transload Inc), but we were unable to confirm a flowpath from the operations area to the ditch were the substance was observed.	We suspect that an underground pipe may exist that could transport material to the outside ditch. DNR Spills and Stormwater programs are planning a site visit to investigate this possibility.			SUNNY	NONE REPORTED	No cleanup was conducted and the material flushed away during a rain event the next day.	TREVOR BANNISTER BY PHONE 13:49
20211208SC28-2	12/8/2021 1540	12/8/2021 1515	50 Gallons of Diesel Fuel	The area was excavated and remaining diesel fuel was recovered in soil and absorbent material.	Jake with Spoerl Trucking	W1307 Industril Dr, Ixonia , Township of Ixonia in a parking lot	Spoel Trucking	Equipment Failure	Hose leak on generator		Snow	None	The oil absorbent was set on fire and the fire dept responded and extinguished the fire using non-PFAS-containing foam. The area was excavated and remaining diesel fuel was recovered in soil and absorbent material.	Caroline Rice was notified by phone